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QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Did the Court of Appeals correctly apply to this 
case its earlier decision holding the three month statute of 
limitations for habeas corpus proceedings unconstitutional? 
2. Did the Court of Appeals correctly refuse to 
review the entire record in this case for an alternative basis to 
affirm when no findings had been made in the district court to 
review and respondent's petition clearly raised due process 
issues? 
COURT OP APPEALS OPINION 
The opinion of the Court of Appeals in this case is 
found at 862 P.2d 1378. 
GROUNDS FOR JURISDICTION 
Respondent agrees that this Court may review this case, 
should it choose to, pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(a). 
Respondent does not agree, however, that this Court has 
jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(g) because 
the opinion of the Court of Appeals in this case did not hold any 
statute unconstitutional. 
CONTROLLING PROVISIONS OF LAW 
The following provisions of law control the Court's 
consideration of this case and are reproduced in full in Appendix 
A: Utah Constitution, Article VIII, Section 1; Utah 
Constitution, Article VIII, Section 2; Rules 46(c) and 46(d) of 
the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure; Rules 65B(b), 65B(c), and 
1 
65B(e) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure; and Utah Code Ann, 
§ 78-12-31.1. 
STATEMENT OP THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case. 
This case began as a petition for a writ of habeas 
corpus from a decision of the Utah State Board of Pardons (the 
"Board"). It was filed in the Third Judicial District Court on 
February 13, 1992. The district court dismissed the petition as
 { 
being frivolous on its face on February 20, 1992, because it was 
filed after the three month statute of limitations period for 
habeas corpus proceedings found in Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-31.1. , 
Respondent appealed to the Court of Appeals, which reversed the 
district court's dismissal because the Court of Appeals earlier 
had ruled that the three month limitations period was 
unconstitutional. 
B. Statement of the Facts. 
Respondent pleaded guilty to manslaughter and was 
sentenced to an indeterminate term of one to fifteen years in 
prison in July, 1990. (R. 13) The Board's own guidelines set 
the recommended term for this offense at 24 months. (R. 19). On 
4 
April 24, 1991, respondent appeared before the Board for an 
original parole hearing. (R. 2, 12) The contents of the Board's 
file used in its consideration were not provided to respondent in 
I 
advance. (See R. 16-19) Because respondent had pleaded guilty, 
no record previously had been created concerning respondent's 
past behavior. The parole hearing was the first opportunity to 
4 
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develop such a record, yet that hearing was so short it only 
created a 14 page transcript. (R. 12-26) Clear issues were 
raised at the hearing whether respondent's crime was intentional 
or the result of a severely diminished capacity caused by low 
tolerance for alcohol. (R. 13-16) Respondent claimed he had no 
memory of the crime and immediately called police when he found 
the victim. (R. 13-15) 
After briefly questioning respondent and hearing from a 
member of the victim's family related by marriage, (R. 13-26) the 
Board Chairman stated simply: 
Mr. Renn, there's a lot about you that we 
don't understand. And you need to know that 
we've got to find out more about you before 
we in good conscience can grant you a parole 
date. We've got to see some activity here in 
the institution and we've got to have that 
psychological [e]valuation I talked about. 
(R. 26) The Board issued an interim decision to rehear 
respondent's case four years later in July, 1995, 60 months after 
respondent's conviction. (R. 26) On April 30, 1991, without 
comment or explanation, and with the admission on the record that 
it really did not know much about respondent, the Board modified 
the interim decision and issued a final decision that it would 
rehear respondent's case seven years later in July, 1998, 96 
months after respondent's conviction. (R. 3, 26) 
Respondent filed a pro se petition for writ of habeas 
corpus on February 13, 1992. (R. 2-28) He challenged the 
Board's final decision as arbitrary because no reason was given 
for increasing the length of time by three years for the 
3 
rehearing of his case. (R. 3) Respondent also fairly challenged 
the actual parole hearing. He attached a copy of the hearing 
transcript to his petition and made several interlineations on 
the transcript itself challenging the matters that were discussed 
and presented.1 (R. 13, 17, 18, 19, 22, 26) It is clear 
respondent did not have the information that the Board would 
consider at the hearing prior to the hearing so that he could 
prepare to refute the claims. His interlineations in the 
transcript challenged this lack of disclosure. (R. 16-19) 
Letters received by the Board in opposition to respondent's 
release were not even read into or summarized on the record. (R. 
18) 
The district court dismissed respondent's petition on 
February 20, 1992 solely because it was filed outside the three 
month limitations period contained in Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78-12-31.1. (R. 35-36) Respondent appealed to the Court of 
Appeals. On September 30, 1993, that court reversed the district 
court based on its earlier decision in Currier v. Holden, 862 
P.2d 1357 (Utah App. 1993), which held the three month 
limitations period for habeas corpus proceedings 
unconstitutional. 
On December 31, 1993, in a parallel proceeding 
respondent brought in federal court, the United States District 
Court for the District of Utah also ruled that Utah Code Ann. 
Because respondent's petition is critical to a determination of 
whether it raised due process issues, it and the district court's order 
dismissing the petition are attached as Appendix C. 
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§ 78-12-31.1 is unconstitutional. Renn v. Noel, Civil No. 
93-C-689J (D. Utah, December 31, 1993) (attached as Appendix B) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The Court of Appeals did nothing in this case that is 
worthy of review by this Court. All it did was apply its ruling 
in Currier, which held the statute of limitations for habeas 
corpus proceedings unconstitutional. This could hardly be 
considered a departure from the accepted and usual course of 
judicial conduct as asserted by the Board as justification for 
this Court granting a writ of certiorari. See Utah R. App. P. 
46(c). Furthermore, because this was not the case that declared 
the three month statute unconstitutional, the Court of Appeals1 
action did not give rise to an important question of state law 
that should be decided by this Court by way of certiorari. See 
Utah R. App. P. 46(d). 
The Board also challenges the Court of Appeals1 refusal 
to review the entire record to find an alternative basis to 
affirm the dismissal. The Court of Appeals acted properly 
because it did not have a complete record to review. All it had 
was respondent's petition and attachments. Indeed, respondent's 
petition and the Board's hearing transcript that was attached 
clearly implicated serious due process concerns that have been 
recognized by the Court of Appeals and by this Court, most 
recently in Labrum v. Utah State Board of Pardons. 227 Utah Adv. 
Rep. 30 (Utah 1993). The magnitude of these due process 
deficiencies would justify this Court in assuming jurisdiction of 
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respondent's petition sua sponte and ordering a new hearing 
before the Board. 
POINT I 
THE COURT OP APPEALS HAD NO CHOICE BUT TO 
REVERSE GIVEN ITS EARLIER RULING HOLDING UTAH 
CODE ANN. § 78-12-31.1 UNCONSTITUTIONAL 
Contrary to the Board's assertions, the Court of 
Appeals has the undisputed power under the Utah Constitution to 
declare a statute unconstitutional. When it declared Utah Code
 { 
Ann. § 78-12-31.1 unconstitutional, that statute became null and 
void of any prior existence'.. With the three month limitations 
period declared void, the Court of Appeals had no choice but to ^ 
reverse the district court. This is hardly inappropriate 
judicial conduct, and it does not raise any important issues of 
state law that should be decided by this Court because the Court . 
of Appeals did not declare a statute unconstitutional in this 
case. 
A. The Court of Appeals has the Power to Declare Laws 
Unconstitutional * 
Article VIII, section 1 of the Utah Constitution 
provides that "[t]he judicial power of the state shall be vested 
in a supreme court, in a trial court of general jurisdiction ^ 
known as the district court, and in such other courts as the 
Legislature by statute may establish." (Emphasis added.) 
Moreover, "[t]he Supreme Court, the district court, and such € 
other courts designated by statute shall be courts of record." 
Id. The Utah Court of Appeals is a "court of record." Utah Code 
Ann. § 78-1-1(2). 4 
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The "judicial power" includes the power to declare laws 
unconstitutional. This Court declared in Sol Block & Griff v. 
Schwartz. 27 Utah 387, 76 P. 22 (1904): 
If . . . notwithstanding the enactment was 
passed with all due deliberation and 
formalities, it be found to contravene 
constitutional provisions, or to constitute 
an infringement upon the rights of 
individuals guarantied by the Constitution, 
the courts have the conceded power to declare 
void the enactment, as being a violation of 
the supreme law of the land. . . . The sole 
question in such case is whether the act 
violates the supreme law of the state or of 
the United States. If it does, it is the 
plain duty of the courts to declare its 
invalidity. 
27 Utah at 392, 76 P. at 23 (emphasis added). Indeed, five years 
later, this Court wrote that "we cannot see upon what theory a 
court can refuse to pass upon the constitutionality of the law in 
any proceeding where the question is properly presented . . . ." 
State ex rel. University of Utah v. Candland. 36 Utah 406, 419, 
104 P. 285, 290 (1909). See also Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 
137, 177-80, 5 U.S. 137, 2 L.Ed. 60 (1803) (the power to declare 
a statute unconstitutional is "of the very essence of judicial 
duty" and "the gravest and most delicate duty that this Court is 
called on to perform"); State ex rel. Richards v. Armstrong, 17 
Utah 166, 174, 53 P. 981, 983 (1898) ("[w]here . . . the mind is 
convinced of the unconstitutionality of the law, the duty which 
devolves upon the court to declare it so is imperative, even 
where, as in this case, the statute appears to be in consonance 
with justice and humanity." (Emphasis added)). 
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The Legislature has recognized that the Court of 
Appeals can declare a law unconstitutional. It has granted this 
Court jurisdiction to review "a final judgment or decree of any 
court of record holding a statute of the United States or this 
state unconstitutional on its face . . . ." Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78-2-2(3)(g) (emphasis added). As noted above, the Utah Court 
of Appeals is a "court of record." 
The Board argues that the limitation on this Court's 
power to declare a statute unconstitutional, found in Article 
VIII, section 2, logically means that the Court of Appeals has no 
power to declare a statute unconstitutional because no similar 
limitation is placed on the Court of Appeals' power. This 
argument misses the point. The absence of a limitation does not 
mean an absence of power. No mention of this Court's power to 
declare a statute unconstitutional was ever made in the Utah 
Constitution until July, 1985, when the language now found in 
Article VIII, section 2 was added,2 yet that such power existed 
Prior to the 1985 amendments, Article VIII Section 2 read as 
follows: 
The Supreme Court shall consist of five judges, which 
number may be increased or decreased by the 
legislature, but no alteration or increase shall have 
the effect of removing a judge from office. A 
majority of the judges constituting the court shall be 
necessary to form a quorum or render a decision. If a 
justice of the Supreme Court shall be disqualified 
from sitting in a cause before said court, the 
remaining judges shall call a district judge to sit 
with them on the hearing of such cause. Every judge 
of the supreme court shall be at least thirty years of 
age, an active member of the bar, in good standing, 
learned in the law, and a resident of the state of 
Utah for the five years next preceding his selection. 
The judge having the shortest term to serve, not 
holding his office by selection to fill a vacancy 
before expiration of a regular term, shall be the 
8 
i s undisputed. No l i m i t s were placed on the powers of any other 
court in 1985. Prior t o these amendments, t h i s Court, as wel l as 
the d i s t r i c t courts , were simply given the "judic ia l power."3 
The l i k e l y reason for l imi t ing t h i s Court's power i s 
that i t a l so was given the r ight to s i t in "divis ions" for the 
f i r s t time in the 1985 amendments.4 In the same sec t ion , and 
immediately a f ter the authorization to s i t in d i v i s i o n s , the 
requirement i s made that there be a majority dec i s ion of a l l 
j u s t i c e s any time the Court declares a s ta tu te unconst i tut ional . 
This l imi ta t ion makes perfect sense because t h i s Court i s the 
Court of Last Resort in t h i s s t a t e . Decisions declaring a s t a t e 
s ta tu te unconst i tut ional under the Utah Constitution would not be 
reviewable by any other court, and dec is ions declaring a s ta tute 
unconst i tut ional under the United States Constitution would be 
reviewable by way of p e t i t i o n for writ of c e r t i o r a r i to the 
chief j u s t i c e , and shal l preside at a l l terms of the 
Supreme Court, and in case of his absence, the judge, 
having in l ike manner, the next shortest term, shal l 
preside in t h i s stead. 
3
 Prior to the 1985 amendments, Art ic le VIII, Section 1 read as 
fol lows: 
The judic ia l power of the State shal l be vested in the 
Senate s i t t i n g as a court of impeachment, in a Supreme 
Court, in d i s t r i c t courts, in jus t i ce s of the peace, 
and such other courts infer ior to the Supreme Court as 
may be establ ished by law. 
The pertinent provisions of Art ic le VIII, Section 2 as i t now 
reads are as fol lows: 
. . . The Supreme Court by rule may s i t and render 
f inal judgment e i ther en banc or in d i v i s i o n s . The 
court shal l not declare any law unconstitutional under 
t h i s const i tut ion or the Constitution of the United 
States , except on the concurrence of a majority of a l l 
j u s t i c e s of the Supreme court. . . . 
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United States Supreme Court, but the practical reality is that 
few of these decisions would ever be reviewed by that court. On 
the other hand# decisions of the Utah Court of Appeals and the 
Utah district courts declaring a statute unconstitutional always 
are directly reviewable by this Court. See Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78-2-2(3)(g). 
The United States District Court for the District of 
Utah also recognizes the power of the Court of Appeals to declare < 
a statute unconstitutional. Following the Court of Appeals1 
decision in Courier, that Court also has declared Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78-12-31.1 unconstitutional. Renn v. Noel, Civil No. 93-C-689J
 ( 
(D. Utah December 31, 1993) (Appendix B). This order stands 
alone from Courier and provides an independent basis to allow the 
district court to first consider this case. . 
The Utah Court of Appeals clearly has not only the 
power, but the duty to declare laws unconstitutional if properly 
presented with the issue. That court declared unconstitutional 
the three month statute of limitations applied by the district 
court in this case. When this case was then presented to it, it 
had no choice but to apply its earlier decision and reverse the 
district courtfs order. 
B. When Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-31.1 was Declared 
Unconstitutional, It Became Null and Void of Prior 
Existence 
I 
When the Court of Appeals used its "judicial power" to 
declare Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-31.1 unconstitutional, that 
statute became as inoperative as if it had never been passed. In 
i 
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State ex rel. University of Utah v. Candland, 36 Utah 406, 104 P. 
285 (1909), this Court wrote that 
[a] legislative act which is in conflict with 
the Constitution is stillborn and of no force 
or effect — impotent alike to confer rights 
or to afford protection. This general 
doctrine is adopted by the courts generally 
and is the doctrine promulgated by the 
Supreme Court of the United States, [which 
wrote] "An unconstitutional act is not a law; 
it confers no rights; it imposes no duties; 
it affords no protection; it creates no 
office; it is, in legal contemplation, as 
inoperative as though it had never been 
passed," 
36 Utah at 418, 104 P. at 290 (citation omitted) (quoting Norton 
v. Shelby County. 118 U.S. 425, 6 S. Ct. 1121, 30 L.Ed. 178 
(1886)) (emphasis added). Thus, the Board's arguments that Utah 
Code Ann. § 78-12-31.1 could have been applied by the Court of 
Appeals to this case, whether as an exception to the doctrine of 
stare decisis or based on the notion that respondent's petition 
sought a common law writ of certiorari, completely lack merit. 
The Court of Appeals decision in Currier made Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78-12-31.1 "as inoperative as though it had never been passed." 
The Court of Appeals could not have engaged in any of the 
illogical manipulative analyses suggested by the Board even if it 
had wanted to. 
In sum, the Court of Appeals had the power to declare 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-31.1 unconstitutional. When it did so in 
Currier, that section became devoid of any existence, and the 
Court of Appeals had to reverse the district court. That it did 
so does not merit review by this Court. 
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POINT II 
THE COURT OP APPEALS WOULD HAVE HAD TO 
REVERSE THE DISTRICT COURT EVEN IP IT TREATED 
RESPONDENT'S PETITION AS SEEKING A COMMON LAW 
WRIT OP CERTIORARI 
Assuming for th€» sake of argument that respondent's 
petition sought a common law writ of certiorari rather than a 
writ of habeas corpus, the Court of Appeals also would have had 
to reverse the district court's dismissal of respondent's 
petition. No time limit currently exists in the Utah Code or the 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure for bringing a petition for a 
common law writ of certiorari or for a petition pursuant to Rule 
65B(e), and no provision exists in Rule 65B(e) for a district 
court to dismiss a petition as frivolous on its face, as the 
district court did in this case. 
A. No Specific Time Limit Exists for Bringing a 
Petition for a Common Lav Writ of Certiorari 
The Board incongruously argues that respondent's 
petition in the district court should be construed as a petition 
seeking a writ of certiorari, yet that the unconstitutional three 
month limitations period for habeas corpus proceedings should 
apply. Section 78-12-31.1 applied specifically to relief sought 
"pursuant to a writ of habeas corpus." Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78-12-31.1. By its plain terms, therefore, it did not apply to 
actions seeking a writ of certiorari. In any event, the three 
1 
month limitations period is void because the Court of Appeals 
declared the entire section unconstitutional. 
12 
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Respondent would not dispute treating his petition as a 
petition for writ of certiorari because no specific limitations 
period is found anywhere for petitions seeking a writ of 
certiorari. Indeed, in Labrum v. Utah State Board of Pardons, 
227 Utah Adv. Rep. 30 (Utah 1993), this Court granted a petition 
pursuant to Rule 65B(e) and Appellate Rule 19 that was filed four 
and one half years after the petitioner's parole hearing in that 
case. 
Former Rule 73 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure may 
have applied in the past to create a one-month time limit to 
appeal from the Board of Pardons, but that section was repealed 
with the adoption of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. The 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure still apply to appeals to the 
district court from agency action, see Utah R. Civ. P. 81(d), but 
no time is provided for seeking review of an agency decision in 
district court. 
Because no time limits applied to preclude respondent's 
petition, the Court of Appeals correctly reversed the district 
court. 
B. Rule 65B(e) Contains No Provision Allowing the 
District Court to Dismiss a Petition as Frivolous 
on its Face 
If respondent's petition should be treated as a 
petition under Rule 65B(e), the district court erred in 
dismissing the petition as frivolous on its face. Only those 
provisions of Rule 65B that parallel the common law writ of 
habeas corpus contain provisions allowing for dismissal when the 
13 
petition is frivolous on its face. See Utah R. Civ. P. 65B(b)(7) 
and 65B(c)(4). Rule 65B(e) contains no such provision. Absent a 
"frivolous on its face" provision, a response to respondent's 
petition was required to place the statute of limitations at 
issue. Statute of limitations must be raised as an affirmative 
defense or be waived. See Utah R. Civ. P. 8(c); American Coal 
Co. v. Sandstrom, 689 P.2d 1 (Utah 1984) (statutes of limitation 
are not jurisdictional and may be waived). The Court of Appeals 
appropriately remanded the case to the district court for further 
proceedings because the statute of limitations had not even been 
placed at issue when the district court dismissed the petition. 
POINT III 
THE COURT OP APPEALS COULD NOT EXAMINE THE 
RECORD FOR AN ALTERNATIVE BASIS TO AFFIRM 
BECAUSE NO RECORD EXISTED AND RESPONDENT'S 
CLAIMS IMPLICATED DUE PROCESS CONCERNS 
The Board argues that the Court of Appeals should have 
reviewed the record in this case on its own to find an 
alternative basis to affirm. The Board is wrong because the 
review standard set forth in Bundy v. Deland, 763 P.2d 803, 805 
(Utah 1988) , requires the appellate court to review "the 
findings" of the district court. No record had even been 
established in the district court to review other than 
respondent's petition and attachments. The Board is also wrong 
because respondent's petition raised several valid due process 
concerns. In agreement, the Court of Appeals failure to review 
the entire record in this case for an alternative basis to affirm 
14 
is not a sufficient departure from proper judicial conduct to 
warrant review by this Court. 
The need for the district court to develop a record 
and make findings is emphasized by the procedural facts 
surrounding Foote v. Utah Board of Pardons, 808 P.2d 734 (Utah 
1991). Foote was an original proceeding in this Court seeking 
habeas corpus relief from a decision of the Board. As an 
original proceeding, no record had been developed concerning what 
happened at the Board hearing. The petitioner alleged a 
violation of due process. This Court wrote that "there is no 
question that habeas corpus review of the board of pardon's 
actions is available," but "[p]recisely what due process requires 
of the board of pardons cannot be determined in the abstract, 
[it] must be determined only after the facts concerning the 
procedures followed by the board are flushed out." 808 P.2d at 
735. Because no "adequate record" existed to review the decision 
of the Board, the matter was referred to the district court for 
appropriate proceedings. Id. 
The current status of this case parallels Foote in many 
ways. Respondent made or fairly implicated the following claims 
in his petition: 
1. Respondent did not have access to all the 
information the Board planned to use at his parole 
hearing so that he could prepare to refute 
negative information. (See respondent's 
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interlineations in the hearing transcript at R. 
13, 17, 18, 19, 22, 26) 
2. The Board made its decisions based on a lack of 
information about respondent, rather than 
sufficient information to warrant a sentence , 
longer than that recommended by the sentencing 
guidelines. (R. 26) 
3. The Board extended its interim decision by three
 { 
years in its final decision, but it gave no 
reasons at all for its decision not to rehear 
respondent's case for seven years, four times the , 
recommended sentence. (R. 3) 
These claims clearly implicate due process concerns and 
not merely the substantive decisions of the Board. This Court 
recently ruled that a failure to provide inmates with copies or 
reasonable summaries of the information to be used by the Board 
at the prisoner's original parole hearing so that the prisoner 
can adequately prepare for the hearing violates due process. 
Labrum v. Utah State Board of Pardons, 227 Utah Adv. Rep. 30 
(Utah 1993) . Similarly, the Court of Appeals has recognized that 
the Board's failure to provide a written explanation for its 
decisions can be a violation of due process. Preece v. House, 
848 P.2d 163, 164 (Utah App,), cert, granted, 853 P.2d 897 (Utah 
1 
1993). Basing a parole decision in excess of the sentencing 
guidelines on a lack of information about the inmate also clearly 
implicates due process concerns because there should be clearly 
16 
articulable reasons why an inmate should remain in prison longer 
than the sentencing guidelines suggest. The Board had none in 
this case. 
As in Foote, no record has yet been developed to "flush 
out" what happened in the Board hearing in this case. The Court 
of Appeals could not have reviewed the record to make a decision 
regarding potential due process violations until a record was 
created. It correctly remanded the case to the district court. 
Given that the Court of Appeals simply remanded this 
case to the district court for further proceedings, it cannot be 
suggested that the Court of Appeals departed from the usual and 
proper course of judicial conduct or that its decision created an 
important question of state law that should be reviewed by this 
Court. The Court of Appeals simply believed that an adequate 
record needed to be created. Respondent should be allowed to 
develop a record and to amend his petition to more artfully state 
specific due process violations that occurred, particularly in 
light of this Court's recent ruling in Labrum. 
POINT IV 
THIS COURT SHOULD ASSUME JURISDICTION OVER 
RESPONDENT'S PETITION AND ORDER A NEW HEARING 
BEFORE THE BOARD 
In Labrum. this court ruled that a prisoner must be 
provided with copies or reasonable summaries of information the 
Board plans to use at the prisoner's parole hearing well enough 
in advance of the hearing to allow the prisoner adequate time to 
prepare for the hearing. 227 Utah Adv. Rep. at 34-37. The 
17 
ruling in Labrum was made applicable "to any inmate who currently 
has a claim pending in the district court or an appeal before 
this court or the court of appeals challenging original parole 
grant hearing procedures on due process grounds." 227 Utah Adv. 
Rep. at 37. 
This is precisely the type of case Labrum was meant to 
apply to. Respondent has raised due process concerns regarding 
his original parole grant hearing. He has fairly implicated the 
problems he confronted at the hearing that arose by not being 
apprised of what was in this file. He was not prepared to refute 
the information in his file and he was not even told what all of 
that information was. This is clear from the transcript of the 
parole hearing that is part of the record before this court. 
This court should assume jurisdiction over respondent's petition 
under Rule 19 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure and, based 
on Labrum, order that respondent be given a new original parole 
grant hearing. 
CONCLUSION 
The Board's petition for a writ of certiorari should be 
denied. The Court of Appeals' actions clearly were appropriate 
and did not raise any questions worthy of review of this Court. 
The Court of Appeals had no choice but to reverse the district 
court based on its earlier ruling that the three month statute of 
limitations for habeas corpus proceedings was unconstitutional. 
Reversal also would have been required if respondent's petition 
were construed as a petition for writ of certiorari or a petition 
18 
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under Rule 65B(e). Finally, the Court of Appeals acted properly 
by remanding for further proceedings in light of the clear due 
process issues raised by respondent. Indeed, the due process 
violations obvious on the face of the record now before this 
Court are sufficient to justify an order from this Court granting 
respondent a new original parole grant hearing. 
DATED this 13,. day of February, 1994. 
WOOD SPENDLOVE & QUINN, L.C. 
ESrr C ryv$^JenkiAs 
Attorneys fox^Respondent 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I caused to be mail, in the U.S, 
mail, postage prepaid, four true and correct copies of the 
foregoing Respondent's Brief in Opposition to Petition for Writ 
of Certiorari to the Utah Court of Appeals this ^ 2 - day of 
February, 1994 to the following: 
Jan Graham 
Utah Attorney General 
James H. Beadles 
Assistant Attorney General 
330 South 300 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
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APPENDIX A 
78-12-31.1. Habeas corpus — Three months. 
Within three months: 
For relief pursuant to a writ of habeas corpus. This limitation shall 
apply not only as to grounds known to petitioner but also to grounds 
which in the exercise of reasonable diligence should have been known by 
petitioner or counsel for petitioner. 
History: C. 1953,78-12-31.1, enacted by L. Cross-References. — Extraordinary relief, 
1979, ch. 133, § 1. Rule 65B, U.R.C.P. 
Section 1. [Judicial powers — Courts.] 
The judicial power of the state shall be vested in a supreme court, in a trial 
court of general jurisdiction known as the district court, and in such other 
courts as the Legislature by statute may establish. The Supreme Court, the 
district court, and such other courts designated by statute shall be courts of 
record. Courts not of record shall also be established by statute. 
History: Const 1896; L. 1984 (2nd S.S.), Cross-References. — Courts generally, 
S.J.R. 1. Part 1 of Title 78. 
Sec. 2. [Supreme court — Chief justice — Declaring law 
unconstitutional — Justice unable to partici-
pate.] 
The Supreme Court shall be the highest court and shall consist of at least 
five justices. The number of justices may be changed by statute, but no change 
shall have the effect of removing a justice from office. A chief justice shall be 
selected from among the justices of the Supreme Court as provided by statute. 
The chief justice may resign as chief justice without resigning from the Su-
preme Court. The Supreme Court by rule may sit and render final judgment 
either en banc or in divisions. The court shall not declare any law unconstitu-
tional under this constitution or the Constitution of the United States, except 
on the concurrence of a majority of all justices of the Supreme Court. If a 
justice of the Supreme Court is disqualified or otherwise unable to participate 
in a cause before the court, the chief justice, or in the event the chief justice is 
disqualified or unable to participate, the remaining justices, shall call an 
active judge from an appellate court or the district court to participate in the 
cause. 
History: Const 1896; L. 1943, S.J.R. 2; Cross-References. — Election following ap-
1984 (2nd S.S.), S.J.R. 1. pointment to judicial office, § 20-1-7.7. 
Statutory provisions, 8 78-2-1 et seq. 
\ 
Rule 46, Considerations governing review of certiorari. 
Review by a writ of certiorari is not a matter of right, but of judicial discre-
tion, and will be granted only for special and important reasons. The follow-
ing, while neither controlling nor wholly measuring the Supreme Court's 
discretion, indicate the character of reasons that will be considered: 
(a) When a panel of the Court of Appeals has rendered a decision in 
conflict with a decision of another panel of the Court of Appeals on the 
same issue of law; 
(b) When a panel of the Court of Appeals has decided a question of 
state or federal law in a way that is in conflict with a decision of the 
Supreme Court; 
(c) When a panel of the Court of Appeals has rendered a decision that 
has so far departed from the accepted and usual course of judicial proceed-
ings or has so far sanctioned such a departure by a lower court as to call 
for an exercise of the Supreme Court's power of supervision; or 
(d) When the Court of Appeals has decided an important question of 
municipal, state, or federal law which has not been, but should be, settled 
by the Supreme Court. 
(Amended effective October 1, 1992.) 
Amendment Notes. — The 1992 amend- subdivision designations from numbers to let-
men t, effective October 1, 1992, changed the ters. 
Rule 65B. Extraordinary relief, 
(a) Availability of remedy. Where no other plain, speedy and adequate 
remedy is available, a person may petition the court for extraordinary relief 
on any of the grounds set forth in paragraph (b) (involving wrongful imprison-
ment), paragraph (c) (involving other types of wrongful restraint on personal 
liberty), paragraph (d) (involving the wrongful use of public or corporate au-
thority) or paragraph (e) (involving the wrongful use of judicial authority and 
the failure to exercise such authority). There shall be no special form of writ. 
The procedures in this rule shall govern proceedings on all petitions for ex-
traordinary relief. To the extent that this rule does not provide special proce-
dures, proceedings on petitions for extraordinary relief shall be governed by 
the procedures set forth elsewhere in these rules. 
(b) Wrongful imprisonment. 
(1) Scope. Any person committed by a court to imprisonment in a state 
prison, other correctional facility or county jail who asserts that the com-
mitment resulted from a substantial denial of rights may petition the 
court for relief under this paragraph. This paragraph (b) shall govern 
proceedings based on claims relating to original commitments and com-
mitments for violation of probation or parole. This paragraph (b) shall not 
govern proceedings based on claims relating to the terms or conditions of 
confinement. 
(2) Commencement. Except for challenges to parole violation proceed-
ings, the proceeding shall be commenced by filing a petition, together 
with a copy thereof, with the clerk of the district court in the county in 
which the commitment leading to confinement was issued. The court may 
order a change of venue on motion of a party for the convenience of the 
parties or witnesses. Petitions challenging parole violation proceedings 
shall be commenced by filing a petition together with a copy thereof, with 
the clerk of the district court in the county in which the petitioner is 
located. 
(3) Contents of the petition. The petition shall set forth all claims 
that the petitioner has in relation to the legality of the commitment. 
Additional claims relating to the legality of the commitment may not be 
raised in subsequent proceedings except for good cause shown. The peti-
tion shall state: 
(A) the place where the petitioner is restrained; 
(B) the name of the court by which the petitioner was convicted 
and sentenced and the dates of proceedings in which the conviction 
was entered, together with the court's case number for those proceed-
ings, if known by the petitioner; 
(C) in plain and concise terms, all of the facts on the basis of which 
the petitioner claims a substantial violation of rights as the result of 
the commitment; 
(D) whether or not the judgment of conviction or the commitment 
for violation of probation or parole has been reviewed on appeal, and, 
if so, the number and caption or title of the appellate proceeding and 
the results of the review; 
(E) whether the legality of the commitment has already been adju-
dicated in any prior post-conviction or other civil proceeding, and if so 
the reasons for the denial of relief in the prior proceeding. 
(4) Attachments to the petition. The petitioner shall attach to the 
petition affidavits, copies of records or other evidence available to the 
petitioner in support of the allegations. The petitioner shall also attach to 
the petition a copy of the pleadings filed by the petitioner in any prior 
post-conviction or other civil proceeding that adjudicated the legality of 
the commitment, and a copy of all orders and memoranda of the court. If 
copies of pertinent pleadings, orders, and memoranda are not attached, 
the petition shall state why they are not attached. 
(5) Memorandum of authorities. The petitioner shall not set forth 
argument or citations or discuss authorities in the petition, but these may 
be set out in a separate memorandum, two copies of which shall be filed 
with the petition. 
(6) Assignment by the presiding judge. On the filing of the petition, 
the clerk shall promptly deliver it to the assigned judge of the court in 
which it is filed. Except for challenges to parole violation proceedings, the 
presiding judge shall if possible assign the proceeding to the judge who 
issued the commitment. 
(7) Dismissal of frivolous claims. On review of the petition, if it is 
apparent to the court that the issues presented in the petition have al-
ready been adjudicated in a prior proceeding, or if for any other reason 
any claim in the petition shall appear frivolous on its face, the court shall 
forthwith issue an order dismissing the claim, stating that the claim is 
frivolous on its face. The order shall be sent by mail to the petitioner. 
Proceedings on the claim shall terminate with the entry of the order of 
dismissal. The order of dismissal need not recite findings of fact or conclu-
sions of law. 
(8) Service of petitions. If, on review of the petition, the court con-
cludes that all or part of the petition is not frivolous on its face, the court 
shall designate the portions of the petition that are not frivolous and 
direct the clerk to serve a copy of the petition and a copy of any memoran-
dum by mail upon the attorney general and the county attorney. 
(9) Responsive pleading. Within twenty days (plus time allowed un-
der these rules for service by mail) after service of a copy of the petition 
upon the attorney general and county attorney, or within such other 
period of time as the court may allow, the attorney general or county 
attorney shall answer or otherwise respond to the portions of the petition 
that have not been dismissed and shall serve the answer or other response 
upon the petitioner in accordance with Rule 5(b). Within twenty days 
(plus time allowed for service by mail) after service of any motion to 
dismiss or for summary judgment, the petitioner may respond by memo-
randum to the motion. No further pleadings or amendments will be per-
mitted unless ordered by the court. 
(10) Hearings. After pleadings are closed, the court shall promptly set 
the proceeding for a hearing or otherwise dispose of the case. Upon motion 
for good cause, the court may grant leave to either party to take discovery 
or to extend the date for the hearing. Prior to the hearing, the court may 
order either the petitioner or the state or county to obtain any relevant 
transcript or court records. The court may also order a prehearing confer-
ence, but the conference shall not be set so as to delay unreasonably the 
hearing on the merits of the petition. The petitioner shall be present 
before the court at hearings on dispositive issues but need not otherwise 
be present in court during the proceeding. 
(11) Orders. If the court rules in favor of the petitioner, it shall enter 
an appropriate order with respect to the validity of the challenged com-
mitment and with respect to rearraignment, retrial, resentencing, cus-
tody, bail or discharge. The court shall enter findings of fact and conclu-
sions of law, as appropriate, following any evidentiary hearing or any 
hearing on a dispositive motion. Upon application of the attorney general 
or the county attorney, or upon its own motion, the court may stay release 
of the petitioner pending appeal of its order. 
(12) Costs. The court may assign the costs of the proceeding, as al-
lowed under Rule 54(d), to any party as it deems appropriate. If the 
petitioner is unable to pay the costs of the proceeding, the petitioner may 
proceed upon an affidavit of impecuniosity, in which event the court may 
direct that the costs be paid by the county in which the complainant was 
originally charged. 
(13) Appeal. Any final judgment or order entered upon the petition 
may be appealed to and reviewed by the Court of Appeals or the Supreme 
Court of Utah in accord with the statutes governing appeals to those 
courts. 
(c) Other wrongful restraints on personal liberty. 
(1) Scope. Except for instances governed by paragraph (b) of this rule, 
this paragraph (c) shall govern all petitions claiming that a person has 
been wrongfully restrained of personal liberty, and the court may grant 
relief appropriate under this paragraph. 
(2) Commencement The proceeding shall be commenced by filing a 
petition with the clerk of the court in the district in which the petitioner 
is restrained or the respondent resides or in which the alleged restraint is 
occurring. 
(3) Contents of the petition and attachments. The petition shall 
contain a short, plain statement of the facts on the basis of which the 
petitioner seeks relief. It shall identify the respondent and the place 
where the person is restrained. It shall state the cause or pretense of the 
restraint, if known by the petitioner. It shall state whether the legality of 
the restraint has already been adjudicated in a prior proceeding and, if so, 
the reasons for the denial of relief in the prior proceeding. The petitioner 
shall attach to the petition any legal process available to the petitioner 
that resulted in restraint. The petitioner shall also attach to the petition a 
copy of the pleadings filed by the petitioner in any prior proceeding that 
adjudicated the legality of the restraint. 
(4) Memorandum of authorities. The petitioner shall not set forth 
argument or citations or discuss authorities in the petition, but these may 
be set out in a separate memorandum, two copies of which shall be filed 
with the petition. 
(5) Dismissal of frivolous claims. On review of the petition, if it is 
apparent to the court that the legality of the restraint has already been 
adjudicated in a prior proceeding, or if for any other reason any claim in 
the petition shall appear frivolous on its face, the court shall forthwith 
issue an order dismissing the claim, stating that the claim is frivolous on 
its face and the reasons for this conclusion. The order need not state 
findings of fact or conclusions of law. The order shall be sent by mail to 
the petitioner. Proceedings on the claim shall terminate with the entry of 
the order of dismissal. 
(6) Responsive pleadings. If the petition is not dismissed as being 
frivolous on its face, the court shall direct the clerk of the court to serve a 
copy of the petition and a copy of any memorandum upon the respondent 
by mail. At the same time, the court may issue an order directing the 
respondent to answer or otherwise respond to the petition, specifying a 
time within which the respondent must comply. If the circumstances re-
quire, the court may also issue an order directing the respondent to ap-
pear before the court for a hearing on the legality of the restraint. An 
answer to a petition shall state plainly whether the respondent has re-
strained the person alleged to have been restrained, whether the person 
so restrained has been transferred to any other person, and if so, the 
identity of the transferee, the date of the transfer, and the reason or 
authority for the transfer. Nothing in paragraph (c) shall be construed to 
prohibit the court from ruling upon the petition based upon a dispositive 
motion. 
(7) Temporary relief. If it appears that the person alleged to be re-
strained will be removed from the court's jurisdiction or will suffer irrepa-
rable injury before compliance with the hearing order can be enforced, the 
court shall issue a warrant directing the sheriff to bring the respondent 
before the court to be dealt with according to law. Pending a determina-
tion of the petition, the court may place the person alleged to have been 
restrained in the custody of such other persons as may be appropriate. 
(8) Alternative sendee of the hearing order. If the respondent can-
not be found, or if it appears that a person other than the respondent has 
custody of the person alleged to be restrained, the hearing order and any 
other process issued by the court may be served on the person having 
custody in the manner and with the same effect as if that person had been 
named as respondent in the action. 
(9) Avoidance of service by respondent. If anyone having custody of 
the person alleged to be restrained avoids service of the hearing order or 
attempts wrongfully to remove the person from the court's jurisdiction, 
the sheriff shall immediately arrest the responsible person. The sheriff 
shall forthwith bring the person arrested before the court to be dealt with 
according to law. 
(10) Hearing or other proceedings. In the event that the court or-
ders a hearing, the court shall hear the matter in a summary fashion and 
shall render judgment accordingly. The respondent or other person hav-
ing custody shall appear with the person alleged to be restrained or shall 
state the reasons for failing to do so. The court may nevertheless direct 
the respondent to bring before it the person alleged to be restrained. If the 
petitioner waives the right to be present at the hearing, the court shall 
modify the hearing order accordingly. The hearing order shall not be 
disobeyed for any defect of form or any misdescription in the order or the 
petition, if enough is stated to impart the meaning and intent of the 
proceeding to the respondent. 
(e) Wrongful use of judicial authority or failure to comply with duty. 
(1) Who may petition. A person aggrieved or whose interests are 
threatened by any of the acts enumerated in this paragraph (e) may 
petition the court for relief. 
(2) Grounds for relief. Appropriate relief may be granted: (A) where 
an inferior court, administrative agency, or officer exercising judicial 
functions has exceeded its jurisdiction or abused its discretion; (B) where 
an inferior court, administrative agency, corporation or person has failed 
to perform an act required by law as a duty of office, trust or station; or 
(C) where an inferior court, administrative agency, corporation or person 
has refused the petitioner the use or enjoyment of a right or office to 
which the petitioner is entitled. 
(3) Proceedings on the petition. On the filing of a petition, the court 
may require that notice be given to adverse parties before issuing a hear-
ing order, or may issue a hearing order requiring the adverse party to 
appear at the hearing on the merits. The court may direct the inferior 
court, administrative agency, officer, corporation or other person named 
as respondent to deliver to the court a transcript or other record of the 
proceedings. The court may also grant temporary relief in accordance 
with the terms of Rule 65A. 
(4) Scope of review. Where the challenged proceedings are judicial in 
nature, the court's review shall not extend further than to determine 
whether the respondent has regularly pursued its authority. 
(Amended effective September 1, 1991; May 1, 1993.) 
APPENDIX B 
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE DISTRICT OF UTAH, CENTRAL DIVISlOP 
BY„ 
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DAVID A. RENN, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
FRANK G. NOEL, 
Civil No. 93-C-689J 
ORDER 
C l w l i ' M u l i U 
* * * * * * * * * 
The plaintiff filed the instant action against the defendant under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, 
inter alia, challenging the constitutionality of Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-31.1 (1992), a statute 
imposing a three-month statute of limitations on state habeas corpus proceedings. The matter 
was referred to the United States Magistrate Judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B). 
On August 25, 1993, the magistrate judge made a report and recommendation that the 
plaintiffs' case be dismissed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d), excepting claims seeking a 
determination of the constitutionality of the three-month limitations statute. The report and 
recommendation also provided that this action should be stayed pending this court's 
determination of substantially the same constitutional issue in Robert R. Gardner v. Michael 
Leavitt, et al, Civil No. 93-C-286J, an earlier filed § 1983 case then also pending before the 
magistrate judge.1 At roughly the same time, the Utah Court of Appeals issued opinions in 
cases of its own striking down § 78-12-31.1 as contrary to Article I, Section 11 of the Utah 
On September 16, 1993, the magistrate judge issued a report and recommendation in Gardner v. Leavitt, 
follwed by an amended report and recommendation filed in that case on October 12, 1993. 
Constitution. See Larsen v. Jorgensen, (No. 910635), P.2d , 1993 WL 412952 
(Utah Ct. App. Oct. 7, 1993); McClellan v. Holden, (Nos. 920467 & 930123), P.2d , 
1993 WL 377019 (Utah Ct. App. Sept. 17, 1993)(two consolidated cases). 
The report and recommendation filed herein suggests that to preserve plaintiffs 
constitutional challenge to § 78-12-31.1, that plaintiffs claim be deemed to invoke federal 
and well as state constitutional guarantees, at least for purposes of declaratory relief, and that 
to that extent, plaintiffs complaint not be dismissed. However, by Order entered this same 
day, this Court has held Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-31.1 to be an invalid legislative enactment, 
consistent with the Utah Court of Appeals' determination of that issue as a matter of Utah 
law. That being the case, a determination of any federal constitutional deficiency inherent in 
§ 78-12-31.1 would now appear unnecessary. 
The report and recommendation filed herein on August 25, 1993 is hereby adopted as 
to the dismissal of plaintiffs damages claims.2 The magistrate judge's recommendation that 
plaintiff be permitted to proceed on his claim for declaratory relief based upon § 78-12-
31.l's invalidity also appears to be well taken. Therefore, 
IT IS ORDERED that, with the exception of plaintiffs constitutional claim for relief 
concerning Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-31.1 (1992), the plaintiffs' complaint is DISMISSED; 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-31.1 (1992) is hereby 
determined to be unconstitutional, consistent with the rulings of the Utah Court of Appeals in 
With respect to plaintiffs written objections to the report and recommendation, the Court suggests that 
plaintiff take the time required to read and understand the United States Supreme Court's opinion in Stump v. 
Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349 (1978), and the opinion of the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit in Van 
Sickle v. Holloway, 791 F.2d 1431, 1434 (10th Cir. 1986). Both are referred to on page 3 of the magistrate judge's 
report and recommendation as the basis for the position there taken, both have binding precedential effect in this 
Court, and both are quite instructive. 
2 
Larsen v. Jorgensen, (No. 910635), P.2d , 1993 WL 412952 (Utah Ct. App. Oct. 
7, 1993), and McClellan v. Holden, (Nos. 920467 & 930123), P.2d , 1993 WL 
377019 (Utah Ct. App. Sept. 17, 1993); the stay of proceedings previously imposed by the 
magistrate judge is VACATED; and the matter is again referred to the magistrate judge for 
further proceedings consistent with this determination. 
DATED this ^ 1 day of December, 1993. 
BY THE COURT: 
BRUCE S. JENKINS 
United States District Judge 
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DAVID RENN 
Attorney Pro Se 
Central Utah Correctional Facility 
P.O. Box 550 
Gunnison, Utah 84634 
IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
DAVID RENN, * 
Petitioner, * PETITION FOR WRIT OF 
* HABEAS CORPUS AND POST 
VS. * CONVICTION RELIEF 
STATE OF UTAH, * Case No 
Respondent. * Judge l JUDGE FRANK G. NOEL 
COMES NOW the Petitioner, DAVID RENN, pursuant to the 
following Rule of Civil Procedure: 
jor Rule 65B(b) since claim is based on original commitment, 
Rule 65B(b) since claim is based on parole violation, or 
Rule 65B(b) since claim is based on probation violation, or 
X Rule 65B(c) since claim is based on parole grant hearing, 
and for cause of action alleges as follows: 
1. Petitioner is being illegally restrained at the following 
location: Central Utah Correctional Facility, P.O. Box 250, 
Gunnison, Utah 84634. 
2. Petitioner was convicted and sentenced at the following 
Court: Petitioner is challenging the Board of Pardons. 
The dates of the proceedings in which the conviction (or Board of 
Pardons decision) was entered are as follows: April 24, 1991. 
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PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS AND POST CONVICTION RELIEF 
3, In plain and concise terms, all of the facts on the basis 
of which the Petitioner claims a substantial violation of rights as 
the result of the commitment (or terms of parole) are as follows: 
a. Petitioner had a original hearing before Heather 
Cook of the Board of Pardons on April 24, 1991, wherein the Board 
of Pardons scheduled a rehearing for July, 1995 with a full 
psychological evaluation prior to hearing. On April 30, 1991, the 
above stated rehearing date was modified and changed to July 1998. 
Petitioner does not know what constituted the interim decision by 
the Board of Pardons to change the petitioner's rehearing from July 
1995 to July 1998. There is no consistency and no logical reason 
for the July, 1998 date. Prison recommendations were 60 months (7-
95); Board of Pardons decision was 96 months (7-98); Board of 
Pardons hearing tape stated 34 months; and Board of Pardons 
guidelines indicate 24 months. 
b. Petitioner contends that the guidelines and matrix 
for a Board of Pardons release date states 24 months, and also the 
tape recording of the petitioner's hearing states a release date 
for 24 months. Twenty-four months should be the correct amount of 
time. 
c. Petitioner has paid all fines and restitution 
imposed upon him by the State of Utah the sum of $26,300.65, and 
2 
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PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS AND POST CONVICTION RELIEF 
has had no disciplinary problems at the Central Utah Correctional 
Facility that would constitute a change in the release date. To 
follow the guidelines. 
4. The judgment of conviction or the commitment for 
violation of probation or parole has been reviewed on appeal. 
Yes The number and caption or title of the appellate 
proceeding and the results of the review are as follows: 
X_No It was not appealed because 
_X_Question not applicable since this claim concerns a parole grant 
hearing for which there is no appeal or administrative remedy. 
5. The legality of the commitment for violation of probation 
or parole or the legality of the parole grant hearing has been 
reviewed on appeal. Yes X No If so, the reasons for the 
denial of relief in the prior proceeding are as follows: 
6. Petitioner requests that he be appointed legal counsel 
based on the attached motion and affidavit of impecuniosity. 
7. The following documents are attached hereto and 
incorporated herein by reference (check all that apply): 
3 
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PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS AND POST CONVICTION RELIEF 
_X Affidavits that support Petitioner's allegations 
_X Copies of records that support Petitioner's allegations, j 
Other evidence that supports Petitioner's allegations 
Copies of pleadings, orders and memoranda of the Court in 
any other post-conviction or civil proceeding that 
adjudicated the legality of Petitioner's commitment 
8. Petitioner was unable to obtain and attach the following 
documents because (list the efforts you made to obtain the 
documents and the results of your efforts): The Board of Pardons 
stated that they lost them. 
9. That pursuant to URCP Rules 6 5B(b)(12) and 5 4(d), 
Petitioner requests that this Court order the Respondent to obtain 
such transcripts of proceedings or court records which are relevant 
and material to this case and requests that the county in which he 
was originally charged be directed to pay the costs of the 
proceeding. (See attached motion and affidavit of impecuniosity). 
10. Due to the continuing nature of the illegal restraint, 
the statute of limitations set forth in Utah Code Ann. §78-12-31.1 
does not bar this action. 
WHEREFORE, Petitioner prays that this Court: 
1. Schedule an evidentiary hearing at which time Petitioner 
may be present and represented by counsel. 
2. Permit Petitioner, who remains indigent, to proceed 
without prepayment of costs, fees or other assessments. 
3. Grant Petitioner the authority to obtain subpoenas in 
4 
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PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS AND POST CONVICTION RELIEF 
Forma Pauperis, for witnesses and documents necessary to assist in 
the proof of the facts alleged in the petition as stated above. 
4. Issue an Order for Post Conviction Relief to have the 
Petitioner brought before it, to the end that he may be discharged 
from the illegal and unconstitutional confinement and restraint. 
Dated this ^7 day of Zfo*T , 1992. 
Sl/<Z*<<(J £1 - /fcc-^ " 
DAVID RENN 
Attorney Pro Se 
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April 24, 1991, Salt Lake City, Parole Hearing 
CHAIRMAN: This is the time and the place for the 
original parole hearing for a David Armand Renn; is that 
correct, sir? 
MR. RENN: Yes, sir. 
CHAIRMAN: Am I saying your last name correctly? 
MR. RENN: Yes. 
CHAIRMAN: USP number 20173; is that correct? 
MR. RENN: Yes, sir. 
CHAIRMAN: Mr. Renn, we'll be taking testimony from 
you today, and we'll need to swear you in, if you'll 
raise your right hand. 
DAVID A. RENN 
was duly sworn, was examined and 
testified as follows: 
• 
MR. RENN: Yes, sir. 
CHAIRMAN: Thank you. For the record, we would like 
to welcome all those visitors to this hearing. Board 
policy does not allow you to address the board with one 
exception, and that one exception by board policy is if 
the victim, or in the case if the victim is deceased, a 
member representing the victim's family can testify. And 
it's my understanding that we do have, in this case it is 
a deceased victim, we have family members present, and 
UU012 
it's my indication that one of the family members does 
want to address the board; is that correct? 
UNIDENTIFIED: That's true. 
CHAIRMAN: At the appropriate time I will call you, 
sir, to testify. 
And for the rest we appreciate your attendance, I'm 
sure Mr. Renn appreciates your attendance and support. 
Mr. Renn, you sit today before the Board of Pardons 
convicted of a serious crime, a second degree felony out 
of Judge Tibb's court in Severe County, a second degree 
felony of manslaughter, carries a term of 1 to 15 years. 
Should indicate that in addition to that lengthy 
expiration date which is found in the year 2005, if in 
fact you serve to the full expiration, there's 
restitution owing in excess of $18,000, and there's a 
$10,000 fine, fatd / *s S~ull 
Now, is that all correct to your understanding? 
MR. RENN: Yes, sir. 
CHAIRMAN: To the specific case you are originally 
charged with the (firstjdegree homicide but pled guilty to 
a second degree manslaughter, and the(^first)degree 
homicide was dropped; is that correct? 
MR. RENN: Yes, sir. 
CHAIRMAN: This crime occurred February 16th, 1990, 
in Monroe, Utah. And this came to the police attention 
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1 after you called the police, indicated to the police that 
2 your girlfriend had fallen and needed help? 
3 MR. RENN: Yes, sir. 
4 CHAIRMAN: However, after the investigation by local 
5 law enforcement officials, there was clear evidence that 
6 indicated that there was a brutal physical beating that 
7 caused extensive damage, hemorrhaging, to the victim and 
8 because of the head trauma, the victim died. 
9 These reports went on to indicate that the severity 
10 of the beating took place for a period of time and in 
11 fact you had left the victim lying on the floor, had gone 
12 to bed and when you woke up at that time summoned 
13 assistance. Now, is that correct? 
14 MR. RENN: No, sir. 
15 CHAIRMAN: Okay. This is a good time for you to help 
16 set the record. Tell me what happened. 
17 MR. RENN: Well, we were drinking, and her having a 
18 bad liver was no excuse for drinking because I knew of 
19 that, and when I went to bed she was up, getting her 
20 stuff ready to leave for California the next day. And 
21 when I got up in the morning — she was dressed when I 
22 went to bed. When I got up in the morning she was laying 
23 on the kitchen floor in her nightgown, and there was 
24 indication of the bathroom — where it looked like she 
25 had slipped or fell because they had tooken a faucet 
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1 I where she had had a mark across her forehead. And it was 
2 I all just a mystery, some kind of an accidental death that 
3 I is really terrible,, It's been a real nightmare for nine 
4 months now, plus the five months I was on — not 
5 probation, but bail. 
6 CHAIRMAN: If you were innocent, why did you plead 
7 guilty to the manslaughter? 
8 MR. RENN: Because they talked to me about the murder 
9 charge of five to life, and that scared me because I had 
10 never been in any trouble like that before and she said 
11 the best way to go to plead, save the state money, and 
12 lawyer costs and all this, make a plea bargain for a 1 to 
13 15. 
14 CHAIRMAN: Were you heavily intoxicated that night 
15 yourself? 
16 MR. RENN: We did, I think, drink quite a bit, yes, 
17 sir. 
18 CHAIRMAN: Do you have blackouts when you drink? 
19 MR. RENN: No. The only blackouts I'd ever had was 
20 from my high blood pressure medicine. 
21 CHAIRMAN: Your history indicates that in the past 
22 when you have been drinking, that there has been almost a 
23 Jekle and Hyde personality change, and that there's been 
24 some violence in the past; is that accurate for me to 
25 say? 
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1 MR. RENN: There has been some violence in the past 
2 to an extent, but most of the time when I drink heavily 
3 or not, if I just go off in a corner somewhere someplace 
4 and go to sleep. 
5 CHAIRMAN: What provokes the violence or the 
6 outbreak? 
7 MR. RENN: I don't know, sir. 
8 CHAIRMAN: There was an indication, and the reason 
9 I'm bringing this out is to see if you can help set the 
10 record. But there's indication that in September of '87, 
11 even though you were not charged with it, that there was 
12 an involvement, an altercation with family members and a 
13 shotgun. And finally a shotgun shot that was fired into 
14 the ground. Can you tell me about that incident that 
15 will help clarify it? 
16 MR. RENN: We was having a weekend party out at my 
17 place there in Valin (sic), California, and it was 
18 getting a little out of hand. Everybody drinking and 
19 there was some drugs there by other people and stuff, and 
20 I had gotten into an argument with one of the gentlemen 
21 there, and we got into a push shove incident, so I 
22 thought if I fired a shot, not at anyone particularly, 
23 just at the ground, I could stir them and threaten them 
24 to leave the property. But later on I found out 
25 discharging a firearm was not the way to get somebody 
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1 escorted off the property. Df$>WISS & y CoO RT~ 
2 CHAIRMAN: Was also an indication that in 1988 that 
3 there was another serious domestic dispute; is that 
4 correct? 
5 MR. RENN: Yes, that was another party thing. 
6 CHAIRMAN: Was anyone assaulted during that domestic 
7 dispute? 
8 MR. RENN: Yesf Sandra was, myself, her. 
9 CHAIRMAN: This is the victim? 
10 MR. RENN: Yes, sir. 
11 CHAIRMAN: This problem, this domestic dispute 
12 indicated that you and her got into a major altercation; 
13 is that correct? 
14 MR. RENN: Yes« 
15 CHAIRMAN: You hit her? 
16 MR. RENN: There was push and shove by both parties. 
17 CHAIRMAN: Did you strike or kick the victim at that 
18 altercation? 
19 MR. RENN: At that time — yes, I had stricken her 
20 but I had three fractured ribs also from the incident. 
21 CHAIRMAN: From her striking you? 
22 MR. RENN: Yes, sir. 
23 CHAIRMAN: So there was some indication in the prior 
24 history that there has been some domestic problems, and 
25 even so, assaultive behavior? D/S/n/tt ^y CLOKJRT 
8 
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MR. RENN: Yes, sir. 
CHAIRMAN: Okay. How long had you known the victim? 
MR. RENN: For about three and-a-half years. 
CHAIRMAN: She lived with you in California? 
MR. RENN: On and off for a couple of times. 
CHAIRMAN: And when did you move to Monroe? 
MR. RENN: November of '89. She had been here for 12 
weeks• 
CHAIRMAN: Okay. Should indicate that I have 
reviewed numerous correspondence, submitted by both 
supporters of you, as well as those that see you as a 
serious threat to society rJorie of them are in between. 
They're all either on one side of the fence or the 
other. Almost an equal number. That leaves the board 
with some serious concerns because you have to understand 
that the main reason that we are sitting in this 
position, number one, is to look at society's interest. 
Number two, what is just deserts, and then number 
three, what's going to be the best thing for you never to 
end up back in prison again. The denial is difficult for 
me, you need to know it. There's a history of it. The 
medical examination and police reports indicated that it 
was more severe than simply falling in a bathroom. If it 
was simply that, I have a hard time believing that the 
criminal justice system would have erred that bad into a 
OU018 
plea negotiation that would eventually land you in 
prison. 
Needless to say, the decision that we have to make 
bases around both aggravating and mitigating . 
^J[v£ Bee"// TZ> 7£IA\ O*> Tht^ /l/KEAdy 
circumstancesrand looking at guidelines. The guidelines 
which are prior history with this particular grievous 
action, have been computed at 24 months service. 
Now, the board can go above that, it can go all the 
way to expiration or it can go under it and let you out 
tomorrow, based upon mitigating and aggravating 
circumstances, but you need to know that there are those 
type of circumstances that we need to weigh out. 
We would ask Ms. Cooke if she has any questions for 
you. 
MS. COOKE: I have a couple questions, Mr. Renn. 
County attorney who prosecuted this case said that, "The 
victim's body exhibited evidence of the most severe 
beating I have ever seen in my professional career" he 
says. And I'm just curious sir, what it was that 
provoked an argument so severe that would result in your 
inflicting that kind of damage? 
MR. RENN: There was no argument that would create 
anything that severe, and I tried to explain to them, 
that the same day and the day before this lady had 
crashed on a quad racer scooter of mine and when she 
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1 drank she liked to ride that thing and get crazy. And 
2 these bruises and a lot of these contusions or whatever 
3 you call them was caused by this quad racer, not by 
4 myself. 
5 MS. COOKE: You mean all that happened before you're 
6 claiming she slipped in the bathroom? 
7 MR. RENN: Yes. 
8 MS. COOKE: I see. Sir, I'm interested in the 
9 statement that you gave at the time that your pre 
10 sentence report was prepared. And I want to ask you a 
11 follow up question about it. In light of the whole, the 
12 whole picture of what happened on that day, what do you 
13 see as the most, I'm trying to even find an appropriate 
14 word, the greatest damage that came to anyone and 
15 everyone as a result of this incident? 
16 MR. RENN: I'm sure to myself and for the family. 
17 There's no replacing Sandra and we all know that she had 
18 a serious drinking problem and a serious liver problem. 
19 MS. COOKE: Sir, I was interested in your presentence 
20 report statement where you were asked to give your 
21 version of the offense and consequences of the offense. 
22 You talk about what trouble this second degree felony is 
23 to you because you're a gun collector and a gunsmith and 
24 it's going to take that away from you. And then you talk 
25 about what trouble it is, that the cost of the attorney's 
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1 fees to you and the bail bonds. And I don't see a single 
2 statement in that whole paragraph of any hint of remorse 
3 for the fact that this woman died. 
4 MR. RENN: They couldn't feel the remorse that I had 
5 and the statement that I've made about the attorneys was 
6 I felt they didn't do a just job. 
7 MS. COOKE: The attorneys didn't do a just job for 
8 you or for her? 
9 MR. RENN: To point out really what had happened, the 
10 truth. 
11 MS. COOKE: And you think that you're the one 
12 suffering from all this? 
13 MR. RENN: We're all suffering. 
14 MS. COOKE: No further questions. 
15 CHAIRMAN: At this time I'd ask you to vacate your 
16 seat. Take this seat right over here, and we'll call up 
17 the representative of the victim's family. Come sit 
18 right up here. 
19 Sir, before we get started, you do have the option of 
20 making your statement with Mr. Renn present or absent. 
21 If you would like him to be absent we would simply tape 
22 record your conversation and your testimony to us today 
23 and any questions we might ask you, and then call him 
24 back into the room and play it back to him. You have a 
25 desire to have the inmate leave the room? 
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1 MR. GUERREZ: No, sir, we collectively agreed he can 
2 stay here. 
3 CHAIRMAN: All right. Sir, I'm going to have to put 
4 you under oath as well. If you'll raise your right-hand, 
5 please. For the record would you please state your full 
6 name. 
7 MR. GUERREZ: My name is Gilbert E. Guerrez. 
8 CHAIRMAN: And your relationship to the victim? 
9 MR. GUERREZ: Brother-in-law, /fboi/f IX uJ^tk^S 
10 CHAIRMAN: And sir, did you affirm that the 
11 information you're about to deliver will be the truth, 
12 the whole truth and nothing but the truth so help you? 
13 MR. GUERREZ: Yes, sir. 
14 CHAIRMAN: Thank you, please proceed. 
15 MR. GUERREZ: My name's is Gilbert Guerrez and I'm 
16 representing the family of Sandra Irene ShanJco. Now, 
17 this family urges that David Renn not be considered for 
18 parole. The beating that he gave Sandra was vicious, 
19 brutal and sustained. To inflict as many wounds as 
20 Sandra had, David Renn beat her for a long period of 
21 time. Then he left her on the floor to die while he went 
22 to bed and slept. 
23 David Renn did not call for help until he found 
24 Sandra the next morning still breathing. According to 
25 the doctors, Sandra was already brain dead from the blows 
13 
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1 to her head. I personally talked to the doctor in Provo 
2 myself. A man that can inflict such pain to another 
3 human being should be made to pay for his crime and 
4 should not be set free. 
5 David Renn's been arrested four times that we know 
6 of, the four of us, for assault and assault with a deadly 
7 weapon. Perhaps he was able to get off three times but 
8 the 4th time he was in prison because he committed this 
9 murder. 
10 Getting by the first three times led to this most 
11 horrible crime against mankind, murder. We will never 
12 know, but if he had been made to pay for the other times, 
13 this last most atrocious crime may not have happened. 
14 David Renn has never had a good thing to say about no 
15 living person, from me anyway, including his own 
16 daughters whom he often — he would only refer to, I'm 
17 sorry to say this, as pigs, sluts, and whores in front of 
18 me and my wife. 
19 He has a brother, and I don't know his name, but who 
20 he has said on several occasions that he hates. David 
21 Renn seems to specifically hate women. Everything David 
22 Renn says about women has always been derogatory. We 
23 feel that David Renn has been building up to this worst 
24 crime, murder, and if he isn't made to pay to the full 
25 extent, it's gonna happen again. 
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1 My wife, Cos Paulene and I saw her sister, Sandra, in 
2 the hospital after the beating. Cos will never get over 
3 the shock of seeing someone she loved in such a mangled 
4 condition. It was bad. Sandra's mother Irene Chenholm 
5 (sic) read the report trying to figure out what happened, 
6 and it is not easy for her to accept the fact that her 
7 daughter Sandra was taken from her in such a savage and 
8 vicious manner. 
9 We all understand that you can't feel our pain and 
10 sorrow, but all we ask is justice. David Renn were to 
11 (inaudible). Thank you. 
12 CHAIRMAN: Thank you. Mrs. Cook do you have any 
13 questions? 
14 MS. COOKE: No, thank you, sir. 
15 CHAIRMAN: That's all. Thank you. Mr. Renn, you've 
16 heard the testimony. I guess one more concern that was 
17 pointed had out is the fact that there has been a 
18 history, that this doesn't seem to be an isolated case, 
19 and that's concerning. Have you ever had a psychological 
20 valuation in the past, anywhere in your past? 
21 MR. RENN: No, sir. 
22 CHAIRMAN: Do you recognize that you might have an 
23 alcoholic personality that could result to violence? 
24 MR. RENN: I'm aware of that. 
25 CHAIRMAN: Do you see yourself as an alcoholic? 
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MR, RENN: Yes, I have a — like to drink. They've 
been programing here at the prison since I've been here 
trying to learn more about alcohol, the affects of it, 
what it does to you, the depressors or anxiety or 
hostility or whatever, 
CHAIRMAN: Before we go into our executive session 
and struggle with our decision, is there anything in 
summation that you would like to say to us before we go 
into our deliberations? 
MR. RENN: Well, I would like to say that the 
testimony that — 
CHAIRMAN: The victim's family? 
MR. RENN: Victim's family congregated together is 
pretty far-fetched. 
CHAIRMAN: We'll ask you to be patient, just stay 
right there in that chair. We'll adjourn into executive 
session and be back. 
(Whereupon a recess was taken.) 
CHAIRMAN: We were back on the record. Before we 
deliver our opinion, we would like to thank everyone for 
their attendance today and a word of caution to everyone 
as you exit. There's strong emotions on both sides in 
this particular case and it would be best for all 
concerned to just leave those emotions here in this room, 
and I mean that as strongly as I possibly can mean. We 
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don't want to have any problems after this hearing's all 
over. 
Mr. Renn, there's a lot about you that we don't 
understand. And you need to know that we've got to find 
out more about you before we in good conscience can grant 
you a parole date. We've got to see more activity here 
in the institution and we've got to have that 
psychological valuation that I talked about • 
»^-.f.-aM«ff*am* 
This is a grievous crime that you've been convicted 
of, the taking of a life. Nothing we can do or you can 
do can put that life back in the frame of that deceased 
woman• 
With all that said, it's the interim decision because 
it will need to be ratified by at least one more board 
member, that we're going to order a rehearing and that 
rehearing will be in(^ July of 1995)with a complete 
psychological valuation. Good luck to you. 
(Whereupon the hearing was concluded.) 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
DAVID RENN, : ORDER OF DISMISSAL 
Petitioner, : Case No. 920900794 HC 
vs. : JUDGE FRANK G. NOEL 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Respondent. : 
Before the Court is a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus 
wherein this petitioner has asked the Court to review action 
taken by the Parole Board. Petitioner claims that the Board of 
Pardons took action on April 24, 1991 to grant him a rehearing 
date of July 1995. Petitioner further claims that a few days 
later on April 30, 1991 the board modified it's earlier decision 
and changed petitioner's rehearing date to July 1998. 
Petitioner claims that the board gave no reasons for the 
modification of it's earlier decision and that there is "no 
consistency and no logical reason" for the later decision of the 
board to grant him a rehearing date of July 1998. 
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RENN V. STATE OF UTAH PAGE 2 ORDER 
This Petition is dated January 27, 1992 and was filed in 
the District Court on February 13, 1992. 
Section 78-12-31.1 Utah Code Annotated provides that an 
action for Habeas Corpus must be brought within three (3) months 
of the time that the petitioner either knows of grounds for the 
petition or in the exercise of reasonable diligence should have 
known of grounds for the petition. The Court is of the opinion 
that petitioner knew or should have known of the action of the 
board by at least April 30, 1991 and therefore the filing of 
this petition on February 13, 1992 is barred by the above 
referenced statute of limitations. 
Accordingly, the Court hereby dismisses said Petition. 
DATED this /£) day of February, 1992. 
FRANK G. NOEL 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
.jliOQc; 
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MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of 
the foregoing Minute Entry, postage prepaid, to the following, 
this <^Q day of February, 1992: 
David Renn 
Petitioner Pro Se 
Utah State Prison 
P. 0, Box 550 
Gunnison, Utah 84634 
Attorney General 
Department of Corrections 
Attorney for Respondent 
6100 South 300 East 
Murray, Utah 84107 
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